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STATE V. NEAL: WHY LESS IS LESS IN AN
ANALYSIS OF REASONABLE SUSPICION
Alicia M. LaPado*

I. INTRODUCTION
“Reasonable suspicion” is an important legal concept that state and
federal courts have addressed numerous times since its debut in Terry v.
Ohio.1 The reasonable suspicion analysis requires a court to perform a
fact-specific evaluation of the particular circumstances of an individual
case.2 The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized the “duty of appellate courts to shape the parameters of police conduct by placing the
constitutional requirement of reasonableness in factual context,”3 and the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists involves the analysis of a “factual mosaic,” so that courts
can better “provide law enforcement officers with the tools to reach correct determinations beforehand.”4 Clear, thorough, and instructive opinions are necessary to reach these goals.
In 2007, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided a case that contained all of the factual components for a reasonable suspicion analysis
that would add to this “factual mosaic.” Unfortunately, a careful look at
the opinion reveals that the court either failed to fully and properly apply
this test, or at a minimum failed to fully explain its reasoning in coming to
its decision, thereby missing its opportunity to do so. In State v. Neal, the
New Mexico Supreme Court considered whether an officer’s ten-minute
detention of a defendant’s vehicle following a valid traffic stop was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.5 On July 30, 2007, the court issued a 3–2 split decision in this case, in which it found that the
information known to the officer at the time of the detention did not
amount to the individualized, specific, articulable facts required to sup-

* Alicia M. LaPado is a third-year student at the University of New Mexico
School of Law, class of 2013. Thank you to my son, Camden, for his patience
throughout my time in law school.
1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. Id. at 37.
3. State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-43, ¶ 19, 164 P.3d 57, 63.
4. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002).
5. See generally Neal, 2007-NMSC-43, 164 P.3d 57.
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port a finding of reasonable suspicion.6 In coming to this decision, the
court considered several factors, including the officer’s observations of
the defendant, the defendant’s demeanor, and the defendant’s denial of
consent to search his truck.7 After first considering each of these factors
individually, the court determined that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion8 under the totality of the circumstances.9 Thus, the court found that
the detention was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that
all evidence obtained as a result of the detention should be suppressed.10
This case note provides a brief overview of the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment and then proceeds to discuss federal and state decisions analyzing reasonable suspicion in various contexts. Parts III and IV
will then explain the factual and procedural history of this case, including
both the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ and the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s rationales for their decisions. Part V will evaluate the way in
which the New Mexico Supreme Court applied the totality of the circumstances test for reasonable suspicion to the facts in State v. Neal, analyze
the New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion, and explain how it fails to
fully and properly analyze the facts of this case according to the established tests for reasonable suspicion. Finally, Part VI will discuss the particular need for New Mexico courts to conduct a complete and thorough
reasonable suspicion analysis.
II. BACKGROUND LAW
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution assures the right of
individuals “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”11 The Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.12 Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual
is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion wherever
he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.13 The U.S. Supreme Court has
pointed out that “what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and
6. Id. ¶ 31, 164 P.3d at 66.
7. Id. ¶ 28, 164 P.3d at 65.
8. Reasonable suspicion requires “some minimal level of objective justification”
that is “more than an inchoate and particularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ ” but less than
the level of suspicion required for probable cause. U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989).
9. Neal, 2007-NMSC-43, ¶¶ 29–31, 164 P.3d 57 at 65–66.
10. Id. ¶ 36, 164 P.3d at 67.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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seizures,” but only those that are unreasonable.14 Accordingly, determining whether a governmental intrusion is reasonable is crucial.
Until 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement to mean that, subject to an established exception, all searches and seizures were to be based on probable
cause and executed pursuant to a warrant.15 In 1968, however, the Court
issued its opinion in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio and adopted the
reasonable suspicion standard for brief investigatory detentions and limited weapons searches in certain circumstances.16 In order to justify such a
detention or weapons search, an officer need now only satisfy the lesser
reasonable suspicion standard, rather than probable cause.17 Since 1968,
Terry has become the go-to case for reasonable suspicion analysis—state
and federal courts have cited Terry for that purpose more than 40,000
times.18 As can be seen in the following discussion of Terry and its progeny, however, determining what is reasonable is harder than it may seem.
A. Terry v. Ohio: The Fourth Amendment, Reasonable Suspicion, and
the Totality of the Circumstances
In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether a “stop and
frisk” fell within the Fourth Amendment’s proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures in Terry v. Ohio.19 In Terry, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment was implicated even when police
officers’ actions stop short of an actual arrest or full-blown search, but it
also established a standard lower than probable cause in situations in
which officers detain an individual and pat-down his clothing for evidence
of weapons.20 Although the Court found the officer’s actions to be reasonable, and thus ultimately upheld the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, the Terry opinion instituted the standard that
has become known as “reasonable suspicion.”21

14. Id.
15. Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948) (stating that, unless an exception
applies, the Fourth Amendment requires searches and seizures be conducted pursuant
to a warrant); see also Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment imposes a presumptive warrant requirement for searches and seizures).
16. Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
17. Id. at 27.
18. LexisNexis Shepard’s Report: Terry v. Ohio (February 10, 2013) available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/ (log in, then follow “Get a Document” hyperlink, then
type in “392 U.S. 1”, then follow “Shepardize” hyperlink).
19. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 (explaining that when an officer performs a stop on the
street, interrogates, and pats down for weapons, it is known as a “stop and frisk”).
20. Id. at 16, 27.
21. Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
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Terry involved an officer’s observations of two men, Terry and his
co-defendant, Chilton. Initially, the two men were standing on a street
corner in Cleveland, Ohio, acting in a manner the officer stated “didn’t
look right.”22 The officer continued to observe the men and watched as
they took turns walking down the street, each time pausing to look in the
same store window.23 Each time, the man who walked down the street
would return to the street corner and confer with the other man.24 The
officer observed them repeat this ritual approximately six times each.25 At
one point, while Terry and Chilton were conversing on the corner, a third
man joined them and spoke to them.26 He then walked away, and Terry
and Chilton resumed their “pacing, peering, and conferring.”27 After approximately ten to twelve minutes they both left, heading in the same
direction the third man had gone.28
The officer decided to investigate further, because he had become
suspicious after observing the defendants’ actions.29 His experience30 and
observations led him to suspect that Terry and Chilton were casing the
store for a robbery31 and to fear that the men were armed.32 The officer
then followed the two men and saw them stop to talk to the same man
with whom he had seen them conversing earlier.33 The officer approached
the three men and asked for their names.34 After the men “mumbled
something” in response to his question, the officer spun Terry around,
patted down the outside of his clothing, and felt a pistol in the pocket of
his overcoat.35 He then told all three of the men to enter a nearby store,
removed the .38 caliber revolver from Terry’s coat pocket, and patted
down the outer clothing of the other two men.36 Chilton also had a re22. Id. at 5.
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5 (noting that this particular officer had been assigned to patrol that
area of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for thirty years).
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. The Court found this suspicion to be credible because the actions of defendants were consistent with the officer’s belief that the men were contemplating a
robbery and that it was reasonable to assume that robbery would involve the use of
weapons. Id. at 32.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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volver in his coat pocket, but the third man was unarmed.37 As a result,
Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons.38
The Supreme Court found that the officer had, in fact, searched and
seized Terry when he subjected him to a stop and frisk.39 However, the
Court decided that the evidence needed to justify a stop and frisk was
“not of the same degree of conclusiveness as that required for an arrest.”40 The Court found that swift action necessitated by on on-the-spot
observations of an officer could not be subjected to a warrant procedure,
but should be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.41
The Court first balanced an officer’s need to search against the intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interest of the individual.42
The Terry Court found that the governmental interest was effective crime
prevention and detection.43 It determined that the officer was discharging
a legitimate investigative function and that the officer’s observations in
this case, when taken together, warranted the intrusion of further investigation.44 Thereafter, the Court determined that the officer was justified in
performing a pat-down of defendants, because this investigation involved
only a limited and confined search for hidden weapons, and was justified
by the interest in reducing risks of physical harm to officers.45 In each
case, it was important to the Court that the investigation was limited in
duration and scope to the governmental interest that justified it in the
first place.46
Furthermore, the Court found that an officer must “point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant an intrusion.”47 The Court emphasized that the facts must be judged against an objective standard, because
anything less would result in searches predicated on nothing more than

37. Id.
38. Id. at 6.
39. Id. at 19.
40. Id. at 11, n.5 (citing People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y. 2d 441, 445, 201 N.E. 2d 32, 34
(1965)).
41. Id. at 20.
42. Id. (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–537 (1967).
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id. at 22–23 (noting that although the circumstance of two men standing on a
street corner or strolling by a store window is not itself unusual, when all circumstances of the men’s conduct were taken together their behavior warranted further
investigation).
45. Id. at 24, 29.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 21.
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“inarticulate hunches.”48 Thus, in justifying a pat-down for weapons, the
question is not whether the officer is certain that a subject is armed, but
whether a “reasonably prudent man in the circumstances” would be warranted in believing his safety was in danger.49 In the “reasonably prudent
man” evaluation, due weight must also be given to the reasonable inferences drawn by the officer from his experience.50
Under the totality of the circumstances, in Terry the Supreme Court
found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to perform a stop and
frisk.51 The observations of the officer and the rational inferences taken
from those observations in light of the officer’s experience, combined
with the governmental interest in preventing and detecting crime and its
interest in officer and public safety, justified the officer’s actions.52 Accordingly, the Court determined that the revolver found on Terry as a
result of the stop and frisk was properly admitted as evidence against
him.53
B. Federal Court Decisions Following Terry
Since Terry, courts have expanded the reasonable suspicion standard to searches and seizures that fall outside of the stop and frisk category. In United States v. Sokolow, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the
principles of Terry to a case in which DEA agents stopped a man for
further investigation based on their suspicion that he was involved in drug
trafficking.54 When agents stopped Sokolow, they knew he had paid
$2,100 in cash from a roll of twenty-dollar bills for two round-trip airline
tickets from Honolulu to Miami, he was traveling under a name that did
not match the telephone number he provided, he had stayed in Miami for
only forty-eight hours, he appeared nervous during his trip, and he did
not check any of his luggage.55 Based on this information, DEA agents
stopped Sokolow after he arrived at the Honolulu airport, escorted him
to the DEA office at the airport, and examined his luggage through the
use of a narcotics detector dog.56 The agents subsequently found 1,063
grams of cocaine in Sokolow’s carry-on luggage.57

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 21, 22.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 30.
See id.
Id. at 30.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
Id. at 3 (also noting that Miami is a city known as a source for illicit drugs).
Id. at 5.
Id.
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As in Terry, here the Court found that while any of these factors,
taken alone, may be consistent with innocent conduct, “taken together
they amount to reasonable suspicion.”58 The Court emphasized the need
to look at the “whole picture” when analyzing reasonable suspicion, stating that “the concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not
‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’”59 The
Court found that, under the facts known to them, DEA agents had reasonable suspicion to suspect that Sokolow was transporting illegal drugs.60
In 2002, the Supreme Court determined in United States v. Arvizu
that a border patrol agent had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory
stop of a vehicle.61 The Court stated that, in order to justify an investigatory stop, there must be “some objective manifestation that the person
stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”62 The border
patrol agent was alerted that a sensor on a road frequently used by drug
smugglers had been activated. When he went to investigate, he saw a
minivan driven by a man and containing a woman in the passenger seat
and three children in the back.63 The driver appeared to be very stiff and
seemed to be trying to pretend the agent was not there, even though he
was driving right next to him.64 The agent saw that the knees of the children were very high and watched as, at one point, the children all put
their hands up and waved at him in a mechanical, odd manner for four to
five minutes.65 The minivan turned off the road at the last place it could
have turned to avoid a checkpoint, which was a road suited for fourwheel drive vehicles rather than minivans.66 When the officer radioed in
for a registration check, he learned that the minivan was registered to an
address in an area notorious for smuggling.67 The officer also knew
minivans to be a type of vehicle smugglers often used.68 The Court stated
that the agent was entitled to assess the situation according to his specialized training and his familiarity with the area.69 Accordingly, the Court
found that under the totality of the circumstances the agent reasonably

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 7 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
Id. at 13.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
Id. at 273.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 270–71.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 276.
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believed the defendant was engaged in illegal activity, thereby justifying
the agent’s stop of defendant’s vehicle under the Fourth Amendment.70
In United States v. Santos, the Tenth Circuit gave particular deference to a trooper’s experience and training in finding that he had independent reasonable suspicion to detain a defendant beyond his initial
detention for speeding.71 The court stated that a reviewing court is required to permit officers to “draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”72 Although it found defendant’s argument that the
trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to search a suitcase in his vehicle
“not without support in the record,”73 the court nonetheless affirmed the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.74
Since Terry, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have
analyzed reasonable suspicion in a multitude of factual contexts. Although the contexts are ever-changing, the basis of the reasonable suspicion analysis originally set forth in Terry remains basically the same.
Reasonable suspicion exists when all of the facts known to the officer at
the time of the detention (and the reasonable inferences taken from those
facts), in light of that particular officer’s experience and training, would
lead that officer to suspect that an individual is engaged in criminal activity.75 Furthermore, courts must make this determination by evaluating all
of the circumstances known to the officer in connection with one
another.76
C. New Mexico Courts and Reasonable Suspicion Under the Fourth
Amendment
New Mexico courts have also followed the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Terry when interpreting reasonable suspicion
under the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Vandenberg, the New Mexico
Supreme Court found that an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct
a protective frisk for weapons where he relied on a “be on the lookout”

70. Id. at 277–78.
71. 403 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2005).
72. Id. at 1124 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
73. Id. at 1125. Although the defendant gave initial consent to search his vehicle,
he refused consent to allow the trooper to search a suitcase located in his trunk and
later contended that the trooper based his finding of reasonable suspicion on this
subsequent refusal to allow search of the suitcase. Id.
74. Id. at 1134.
75. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968).
76. Id. at 22; U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
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alert and his own observations of the suspect’s demeanor.77 The court emphasized the importance of the officer’s articulation of specific reasons
and specific observations of the defendant’s conduct that justified his
need for a weapons frisk.78
Conversely, in State v. Prince, the court found that an officer lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain an individual beyond the time necessary to
issue a traffic citation where the officer failed to provide “crucial details
and particularized information regarding the alleged criminal activity that
was occurring.”79 Despite the validity of the defendant’s initial detention
for speeding, the court emphasized that the officer could not use the initial detention “to fish for evidence of other crimes” without independent
reasonable suspicion to detain him beyond the initial stop.80
In State v. Robbs, a case heavily relied on by the court of appeals in
Neal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals found that a tip from an informant provided reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop of defendant’s vehicle.81 In the context of tips from informants, the court found
that the informant’s ability to predict a suspect’s behavior demonstrates a
familiarity with that suspect that indicates the informant has reliable information.82 Accordingly, the court found that, because an officer’s reasonable suspicion depends on the reliability and the content of the
information in his possession, a suspect’s movements through time that
track with the predictions of the informant can provide reasonable
suspicion.83
Having found that the officer’s investigatory stop of the defendant
was justified by reasonable suspicion,84 the court also found that the scope
of the detention was reasonable.85 In making this determination, the court
weighed the government’s justification for the detention, the character of
the intrusion on the individual detained, police diligence in conducting

77. 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 29, 81 P.3d 19, 27 (stating that the officer testified that the
defendant exhibited an extreme degree of nervousness, which in his experience indicated that the defendant may have been in “fight or flight” mode).
78. Id. ¶ 28, 81 P.3d at 27.
79. 2004-NMCA-127, ¶ 17, 101 P.3d 332, 338.
80. Id. ¶ 19, 101 P.3d at 338.
81. 2006-NMCA-061, 136 P.3d 570.
82. Id. ¶ 14, 136 P.3d at 575.
83. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 136 P.3d at 575.
84. Id. ¶ 19, 136 P.3d at 572. The informant told police that her husband would be
delivering methamphetamine to a specific address, described the vehicle, and gave the
license plate number; the officers later observed a vehicle matching that description
proceeding toward the address specified by the informant. Id. ¶ 2, 136 P.3d at 572.
85. Id. ¶ 31, 136 P.3d at 579.
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the investigation, and the length of the detention.86 Regarding these factors, the court found that the officer’s detention was justified by his reasonable suspicion, that the defendant’s freedom of movement had not
been severely restricted, that the officer’s use of a drug dog was a means
of investigation that would confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly, and
that officers acted with diligence by immediately requesting the drug
dog.87 Accordingly, detaining the defendant for thirty-five to forty minutes to await a drug dog was within the permissible scope of the investigatory stop.88 Because the officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate an
investigatory stop and because the scope of the detention was also reasonable, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.89
Overall, the New Mexico appellate cases have tracked the federal
cases in their treatment and analysis of reasonable suspicion. The important factors in such an analysis in either case continue to be those articulated in Terry. Thus, a court must make a thorough analysis of all of the
surrounding circumstances and facts in conjunction with one another.
This analysis should also account for the particular officer’s experience
and training. As explained in the following section, however, in Neal the
New Mexico Supreme Court fell short in both of these areas.
III. FACTUAL BACKGOUND
On July 31, 2004, Alamogordo Department of Public Safety Officer
Neil LaSalle observed a truck stopped in front of a house that was the
subject of an ongoing drug investigation.90 The vehicle was driven by
David Neal (though Officer LaSalle did not know his identity at that
time), and an unknown man was leaning into the driver’s side window.91
Although Officer LaSalle could not see the two men’s hands or hear what
they were saying, he believed that they were engaged in a drug transaction.92 Before Officer LaSalle could approach the truck, however, the
man who was leaning into the truck went back into the house, and Neal
drove away.93 Officer LaSalle decided to follow Neal and noticed that the

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. ¶ 21, 136 P.3d at 577.
Id. ¶¶ 24, 29, 136 P.3d at 578–79.
Id. ¶ 31, 136 P.3d at 579.
Id.
State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-43, ¶ 4, 164 P.3d 57, 60.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5, 164 P.3d at 60.
Id.
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truck had a cracked windshield.94 When he initiated a traffic stop for the
cracked windshield violation, he recognized Neal from his prior drug-related and assault convictions.95 Officer LaSalle asked Neal for his driver’s
license, registration, and insurance.96 He then ran a wants and warrants
check and was advised to proceed with caution, because Neal might be
armed and dangerous.97 Officer LaSalle was also informed that due to
Neal’s prior record a back-up officer was on the way.98
Officer LaSalle asked Neal to identify the man to whom he had
been speaking in front of the house and learned that the man was Jeff
Horton, an individual who had been involved in criminal activity and was
under investigation for drugs.99 According to Officer LaSalle, Neal became agitated and nervous during this questioning.100 Specifically, he
stated that Neal’s hands were fidgety, he avoided eye contact and questioning, and he looked as if he wanted to leave.101 Neal was issued a citation for the cracked windshield.102 Officer LaSalle then requested
permission from Neal to search the truck for drugs and weapons, but
Neal refused consent.103 At that time, Officer LaSalle informed Neal that
he was free to go, but that the truck would be detained so that he could
get a drug dog to perform a perimeter sniff of the vehicle.104 Based on his
observations of Neal in front of the house and during the stop, his belief
that Neal had engaged in a drug transaction, and his knowledge of both
Neal’s and Horton’s criminal histories, Officer LaSalle believed he had
reasonable suspicion to detain the truck while awaiting the drug dog.105
Neal then left the truck to find a pay phone to call his father, James
Neal, who was the owner of the truck.106 Within approximately ten minutes, a Border Patrol Officer arrived at the scene with a drug-sniffing
dog.107 When Neal’s father arrived shortly thereafter, he observed the
drug-sniffing dog jump in and out of the truck and was advised that the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

¶ 6, 164 P.3d at 60.

¶ 7, 164 P.3d at 60.

¶ 8, 164 P.3d at 60.
¶ 9, 164 P.3d at 60.
¶¶ 8, 11, 164 P.3d at 60, 61.
¶ 10, 164 P.3d at 60.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\43-1\NMX109.txt

298

unknown

Seq: 12

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

3-MAY-13

14:11

[Vol. 43

officers were in the process of obtaining a search warrant.108 Neal’s father
then gave oral consent to the search of the vehicle and later signed a
written consent form.109 When officers searched the truck pursuant to his
consent, they found a loaded firearm and methamphetamine.110
IV. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Neal successfully moved to suppress the handgun and
methamphetamine found in the truck, claiming that the evidence was obtained in an illegal search and seizure under both the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution and article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.111 The district court found that although expansion of the initial
traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the subsequent tenminute detention of the truck required probable cause, which the officers
did not have.112 The State of New Mexico appealed this decision, and in a
split opinion the court of appeals reversed the decision of the district
court.113 The New Mexico Supreme Court then granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the court of appeals.114
A. New Mexico Court of Appeals
Like the district court, the court of appeals found that Officer
LaSalle’s expansion of the initial traffic stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion, but it further found that his reasonable suspicion was sufficient
to support the subsequent ten-minute detention of the truck.115 In reaching its decision, the court relied largely on its previous decision in State v.
Robbs, a case in which officers were found to have had reasonable suspicion to detain a vehicle for nearly forty-five minutes to wait for a drug
sniffing dog based on a specific tip provided by an informant.116
The court of appeals based its determination that Officer LaSalle
had reasonable suspicion to suspect Neal of drug activity on the totality
of the circumstances.117 The court stated that when Officer LaSalle initiated the traffic stop, he only had a general suspicion or hunch of such
108. Id. ¶ 11, 164 P.3d at 61.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. ¶ 2, 164 P.3d at 59.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. ¶ 3, 164 P.3d at 60.
115. Id. ¶ 2, 164 P.3d at 59.
116. Id.; State v. Robbs, 2006-NMCA-61, ¶ 31, 136 P.3d 570, 579.
117. State v. Neal, No. 25,864, Memorandum Opinion at 6; see also U.S. v. Santos,
403 F.3d 1120, 1133 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that under a totality of the circum-
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drug activity,118 but that the additional information learned during the
stop was sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.119 The court emphasized that although, considered individually, the facts known to LaSalle
may have been insufficient to create reasonable suspicion, when taken
together in context this information could establish reasonable
suspicion.120
Satisfied that LaSalle had reasonable suspicion to investigate drug
activity, the court proceeded to follow the analysis conducted in Robbs to
evaluate the scope of LaSalle’s investigatory detention.121 After analyzing
each of the four factors, the court determined that each had been met.
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s grant of Neal’s motion
to suppress and remanded the case.122
Judge Kennedy dissented from the majority opinion, stating that
LaSalle lacked the individualized, articulable suspicion required to justify
his detention of Neal.123 He concluded by opining that the case was distinguishable from Robbs and that he “saw more hunch and conjecture supporting the detention than [the court] should allow.”124
B. New Mexico Supreme Court
In a 3-2 split decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals’ ruling, finding that Officer LaSalle did not have a specific and particularized suspicion to detain Neal beyond the time necessary to issue the traffic citation for the cracked windshield.125 Because the
parties did not dispute the validity of LaSalle’s initial traffic stop, the
court acknowledged that LaSalle had authority to ask for Neal’s license,
stances analysis, a court should not look at each fact individually but rather consider
all facts together to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists).
118. Neal, No. 25,864, Memorandum Opinion at 5 (stating that at the time LaSalle
initiated the stop he had a general suspicion that drug activity had taken place based
on his observation of Neal in front of a house under investigation for drug activity and
a man leaning into Neal’s truck).
119. Neal, No. 25,864, Memorandum Opinion at 5 (including Neal’s criminal record, the fact that the man who was leaning into his truck was the subject of a drug
investigation, and Neal’s nervousness, avoidance of eye contact, and appearance of
wanting to leave).
120. Id. at 6.
121. In its analysis, the court considered four factors to assess the reasonableness
of this detention: “the government’s justification for the detention, the character of
the intrusion on the individual, the diligence of the police in conducting the investigation, and the length of the detention.” Id.
122. Id. at 8.
123. Id. at 9 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 9 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
125. State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-43, ¶ 36, 164 P.3d 57, 67.
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registration, and insurance information as a result of the stop.126 What the
court saw as the core issue was whether LaSalle then had a reasonable
suspicion that Neal was in possession of drugs, thereby justifying his detention of the vehicle beyond the time required to issue a traffic
citation.127
Although the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied heavily on
Robbs,128 the supreme court agreed with Judge Kennedy’s view that
Robbs was distinguishable from Neal because the officers’ reasonable suspicion in Robbs evolved from a specific tip that was subsequently corroborated by police observations.129 The court wrote that the only valid basis
for LaSalle’s stop of Neal, however, was a cracked windshield.130 Accordingly, the court rejected the contention that the Robbs decision was controlling in Neal’s case and relied on other case law in making its
determination.131
The court then went on to assess whether LaSalle had reasonable
suspicion to detain Neal beyond the purposes of the traffic stop according
to the totality of the circumstances.132 Although the court recognized that
it should not analyze each individual factor “in a vacuum,”133 the court
wrote that it was nonetheless compelled to address each of the factors
relied upon by LaSalle in forming his belief that he had reasonable suspicion that drugs were in the vehicle.134
In addressing LaSalle’s observation that Neal was nervous and appeared eager to leave, the court cited both New Mexico and Tenth Circuit
case law to support its conclusion that simple nervousness cannot be
equated with reasonable suspicion.135 The court also stated that Neal’s
interaction and association with Horton was insufficient to create reason-

126. Id. ¶ 22, 164 P.3d at 63.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. ¶ 23, 164 P.3d at 64 (noting that in Robbs, police had reasonable suspicion
based on a specific tip they received regarding a drug transaction that would be taking
place, and where, when conducting surveillance of the identified residence, police
then saw the vehicle described at approximately the time predicted by the informant).
130. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 23, 164 P.3d at 64.
131. See id.
132. Id. ¶ 28, 164 P.3d at 65.
133. Id. (stating that such an approach, referred to as “divide and conquer,” is precluded under a totality of the circumstances assessment).
134. Id.
135. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043 ¶ 29, 164 P.3d at 65 (citing State v. Vandenberg, 2003NMSC-030, ¶ 31, 81 P.3d 19, 27–28; United States v. Millan-Diaz, 975 F.2d 720, 722
(10th Cir. 1992)).
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able suspicion.136 The court considered Neal’s denial of consent to search
the truck “a neutral act,” and thus refused to factor his denial into its
reasonable suspicion analysis.137
The court determined that, even taking into account LaSalle’s training and experience, it was unreasonable for LaSalle to infer that Neal had
been involved in a drug transaction.138 Indulging the factual inferences
drawn by LaSalle, the court found that Neal’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances did not amount to the kind of individualized, specific,
articulable facts required to amount to reasonable suspicion.139 Agreeing
with Judge Kennedy’s dissent from the court of appeals, the supreme
court stated that the circumstances “smack[ed] more of . . . conjecture
and hunch” and were thus insufficient.140 Without reasonable suspicion
that Neal was involved in criminal activity, LaSalle could not lawfully detain Neal’s truck to wait for a drug dog.141 The court stated that to find
otherwise “would eviscerate the very protection of individual rights and
liberties the Fourth Amendment was designed to create and which this
Court has taken an oath to uphold.”142
In a dissent joined by Justice Maes, Justice Bosson criticized the majority for its failure to evaluate the specific length of the detention, give
adequate deference to LaSalle’s experience and training, balance the governmental interest in preventing the use and distribution of
methamphetamine against Neal’s right to be free from governmental intrusion, and properly evaluate each of the factors known to LaSalle under
the totality of the circumstances.143 Justice Bosson also expressed concern
that the majority did not discuss more recent Tenth Circuit precedent in
its evaluation of reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.144
Under a proper Fourth Amendment analysis, giving due deference to the
officer’s experience and training, Justice Bosson concluded that LaSalle
could reasonably suspect Neal of drug activity.145

136. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 30, 164 P.3d at 66 (making this determination notwithstanding the fact that Horton was a felon under investigation for drug activity).
137. Id. (citing Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 46, 81 P.3d at 33).
138. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 31, 164 P.3d at 66.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 32, 164 P.3d at 66.
142. Id. ¶ 31, 164 P.3d at 66.
143. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 39–47, 164 P.3d at 67–70, (Bosson, J., dissenting).
144. Id. ¶ 48, 164 P.3d at 70 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
145. Id. ¶ 49, 164 P.3d at 70 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
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V. ANALYSIS
In State v. Neal, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that Officer
LaSalle lacked the reasonable suspicion required to detain Neal beyond
the time necessary to issue a traffic citation.146 The court purported to
apply the reasonable suspicion balancing test launched by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry and applied by state and federal courts ever
since.147 However, a closer look at the opinion reveals that the court either failed to fully and properly apply this test, or at a minimum failed to
fully explain its reasoning in coming to its decision. The Neal court itself
noted the “duty of appellate courts to shape the parameters of police
conduct by placing the constitutional requirement of reasonableness in
factual context,”148 yet its incomplete application of the reasonable suspicion test offers little guidance to officers and in all actuality may only
confuse them. Moreover, although the court in this case may have come
to the correct decision, the danger remains that subsequent courts looking to the Neal opinion for guidance will apply the test similarly and, in
doing so, reach improper results.149
A. Reasonable Suspicion under the Totality of the Circumstances
The totality of the circumstances test for reasonable suspicion is, by
its nature and design, not a bright-line rule for courts and officers to follow.150 This test involves a fact-specific evaluation of the particular circumstances of an individual case.151 The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that this involves the analysis of a “factual mosaic,” but also
wrote that, under this de novo approach, courts can better “provide law
enforcement officers with the tools to reach correct determinations beforehand.”152 Thus, under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the importance of evaluating all facts in combination with one another requires
a proper consideration of each relevant factor.153

146. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, 164 P.3d 57.
147. Id. ¶ 18, 164 P.3d at 62–63 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
148. Id. ¶ 19, 164 P.3d at 63 (quoting State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 19,
81 P.3d 19, 24-25).
149. This analysis does not question the court’s decision, but instead questions its
method in coming to that decision. Whether this decision was ultimately correct is
difficult to determine given the court’s failure to address all relevant factors.
150. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (noting that reasonable suspicion is an “elusive concept” that the court has “deliberately avoided reducing to a
‘neat set of legal rules’ ” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
151. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
152. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275.
153. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22–23.
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The opinions in Terry and Santos provide good examples of evaluations of all facts in a totality of the circumstance analysis.154 In Terry, the
U.S. Supreme Court took care to address inferences drawn from the officer’s observations in connection with one another in finding that, although each of Terry’s actions may have been innocuous in isolation,
together they amounted to reasonable suspicion.155 Similarly, in Santos,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed each of the observations separately and then evaluated all facts together.156 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a set of facts that “might not mean much to
ordinary observers,” when taken together, amounted to an objective basis
for suspecting legal wrongdoing.157 In both cases, both the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Tenth Circuit fully addressed the facts known to the officers in each case at the time those officers initiated the detentions of the
respective defendants.158 Moreover, the courts evaluated these factors not
in isolation, but “taken as a whole” in combination with one another.159
In Neal, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed only
the following factors upon which LaSalle based his determination of reasonable suspicion: “[d]efendant’s stopping in front of a house under investigation; talking to Horton, a convicted felon; becoming nervous when
stopped by police; wishing to leave; and denying consent to search the
truck.”160 Oddly absent from this list of factors is Neal’s own criminal history, which included drug-related convictions.161 LaSalle was aware of
that information when he stopped Neal for the cracked windshield and
recognized him.162 He then confirmed that information when he checked
Neal for warrants.163 Because LaSalle learned of Neal’s history prior in
connection with a valid traffic stop, he could validly consider the information as part of his reasonable suspicion analysis.164 Furthermore, Neal’s
drug convictions would seem particularly relevant to the court’s analysis

154. See Terry, 392 U.S. 1; U.S. v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2005).
155. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22–23.
156. Santos, 403 F.3d at 1127–33.
157. Id. at 1133–34.
158. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22–23; Santos, 403 F.3d at 1127–33.
159. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22–23; Santos, 403 F.3d at 1127 (“In the final analysis . . . the question is whether, taken as a whole, [the facts] support a finding of reasonable suspicion.”).
160. State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 28, 164 P.3d 57, 65.
161. See id.
162. Id. ¶ 5, 164 P.3d at 60.
163. Id. ¶ 6, 164 P.3d at 60.
164. See State v. Prince, 2004-NMCA-127, ¶ 9, 101 P.3d 332, 336 (stating that officers can request license, insurance, and registration, and run a warrants check in
connection with a valid traffic stop).
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because LaSalle based his finding of reasonable suspicion, at least in part,
on his knowledge of Neal’s prior criminal history.165
The court’s failure to consider or address Neal’s criminal history is
troubling because it generally undermines the court’s totality of the circumstances analysis by omitting one of the circumstances from its analysis. This is particularly problematic where that circumstance is an
individual’s criminal history, as courts have recognized that this is a potentially significant factor.166 Although an individual’s criminal history on
its own is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion, “in conjunction with
other factors, criminal history contributes powerfully to the reasonable
suspicion calculus.”167 The court was clearly aware of LaSalle’s knowledge
of Neal’s criminal history,168 and the court initially included that information in its list of factors on which LaSalle based his reasonable suspicion.169 Nonetheless, when the court later listed the factors it was
“compelled to address,” Neal’s criminal history had vanished.170 This factor should have been addressed because, particularly when combined
with the other factors, it may have tipped the reasonable balance analysis
in favor of Officer LaSalle. Additionally, by omitting LaSalle’s knowledge of Neal’s criminal history from its determination the court sets inadequate precedent for future courts and law enforcement alike.
B. Officer LaSalle’s Training and Experience
In its evaluation of an officer’s determination of reasonable suspicion, a court should take into consideration that officer’s training and experience.171 In the Terry opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically
described the extent of the detective’s experience and training.172 The
Court explained how long he had been an officer and detective, the
amount of time he had spent patrolling the particular area of town, and
the type of investigations he had conducted during that time.173 It also
described the routine habits of observation he had developed over the
years he spent as a detective in the area.174 Similarly, in Sokolow, the U.S.
Supreme Court made note of the specific narcotics training the agent
165. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 9, 164 P.3d at 60.
166. United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005).
167. Id.
168. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 5, 164 P.3d at 60.
169. Id. ¶ 9, 164 P.3d at 60.
170. See id. ¶ 28, 164 P.3d at 65.
171. See U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27 (1968).
172. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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there had received as a DEA officer when considering “the evidentiary
significance as seen by a trained agent.”175
The Neal opinion would have been a better guide if the New Mexico
Supreme Court had followed the U. S. Supreme Court’s examples in
Terry and Sokolow in evaluating LaSalle’s experience and training. The
court did acknowledge that LaSalle was entitled to “make an assessment
of the situation in light of his specialized training and familiarity with the
customs of the area’s inhabitants.”176 The court concluded that, taking
LaSalle’s training and experience into account, it was not reasonable for
him to believe that Neal had been involved in a drug transaction.177 What
the court did not do, however, is clearly explain what it considered
LaSalle’s training and experience to include, and what, if any, weight
should be given to that experience and training.178
In the “Facts” section of the opinion, the court did note that: (1)
when LaSalle first viewed Neal, Neal was parked in front of a house
under investigation for drugs; (2) after LaSalle stopped Neil, he recognized him and knew that he had prior drug and assault convictions; and
(3) LaSalle later learned that Horton, the man leaning into Neal’s window, was under investigation for drugs and had a criminal background.179
All of these circumstances became known to LaSalle prior to his expansion of the traffic stop,180 and they likely factor in to the court’s assessment of LaSalle’s experience and/or familiarity with the customs of the
area’s inhabitants. What the court failed to mention, however, is whether
LaSalle had any specialized training that would render the inferences he
made from this knowledge any more reasonable.
The court’s opinion did not explain, or alternatively question, how
LaSalle came to the conclusion that he had observed a drug transaction
based on his observation of Horton leaning into Neal’s driver side window in front of the house.181 Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry and
Sokolow,182 the Neal court did not discuss whether LaSalle had any specialized training or particular experience that might have better enabled
him to come to such a conclusion. That factor may have been particularly

175. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
176. State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 31, 164 P.3d 57, 66 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S.
at 276).
177. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 31, 164 P.3d at 63.
178. See Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, 164 P.3d 57.
179. Id. ¶¶ 4–7, 164 P.3d at 60.
180. Id.
181. Id. ¶ 5, 164 P.3d at 60.
182. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10
(1989).
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important here, because Officer LaSalle did not hear anything Neal and
Horton were saying and could not see their hands.183 Even though LaSalle
gained additional information during the traffic stop, the court did not
mention his level of training or how his experience would or would not
lead him to reasonably suspect that Neal was involved in drug activity.184
In its opinion in Neal, the New Mexico Supreme Court should have
followed the example set by U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding the
importance of an officer’s experience and training in evaluating reasonable suspicion. Whether a particular officer has experience spanning several years or only days influences his or her decision-making processes.185
Likewise, any specific training an officer has received in a particular area
of law enforcement will necessarily inform the officer’s evaluation of reasonable suspicion and support his credibility in making that decision.186
Accordingly, including even a short analysis of LaSalle’s experience and
training, if only to state that he did not have any special training that
would warrant particular deference to his evaluation, would have added
clarity and strength to the court’s opinion.
C. Balancing Governmental Interests Against Neal’s Interests
In Terry, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that the test for reasonableness requires courts to balance the need to search against the invasion that the search entails.187 The Court found that the governmental
interest in crime prevention justified the officer’s reasonable investigation
of suspects based on their behavior.188 The officer’s investigation was related to this interest.189 As for the officer’s further invasion of Terry’s personal security, the Court determined that this investigation involved only
a limited and confined search for hidden weapons, and was justified by

183. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 5, 164 P.3d at 60.
184. In State v. Vandenberg, the New Mexico Supreme Court itself pointed out that
the detaining officer made approximately fifty traffic stops a night and was an experienced officer. 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 9, 83 P.3d 19, 23.
185. See United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 520–21 (5th Cir. 2011) (absent extrinsic evidence regarding an officer’s experience, the court was unable to evaluate
the validity, basis or intent of his statements that defendant appeared unusually nervous during a traffic stop).
186. See id.
187. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
188. Id. at 22 (stating that this interest “underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause
to make an arrest”).
189. Id.
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the interest in reducing risks of physical harm to officers.190 In Vandenberg, the New Mexico Supreme Court also cited to this balancing requirement in the context of a protective search.191 Later, in Robbs, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals applied the balancing of governmental interests
against defendant’s privacy rights in the context of an investigatory
stop.192
The Neal majority, however, neglected to address the need to balance the governmental interest in detecting and preventing drug use and
distribution against Neal’s interest in being free from unwarranted intrusion. The only mention of this balancing analysis appears in Justice Bosson’ dissent, which points out the majority’s failure to perform this
balancing portion of the reasonable suspicion test.193 Justice Bosson states
that “the majority appears to conclude that no amount of investigatory
detention for drugs . . . could be justified based on what Officer LaSalle
knew.”194 He then uses language such as “I suppose” and “I am compelled to this conclusion” when discussing the majority’s likely position
that no amount of detention could be justified based on what LaSalle
knew.195 Justice Bosson’s criticism of the majority is correct. The majority
had previously determined that LaSalle lacked reasonable suspicion to
investigate,196 and thus any expansion of the initial traffic stop would
seemingly be unjustified. However, the court should have addressed this
portion of the reasonable suspicion analysis rather than ignoring it altogether and leaving this conclusion to conjecture. Even though it relates to
the scope of detention rather than justification for that detention in the
first place, the court has a responsibility to make its decisions clear.
If even New Mexico Supreme Court justices are left to make suppositions about the exact position of court opinions, how are future courts
or officers to determine the importance of how and when to use this part
of the reasonable suspicion analysis? The majority opinion should have
stated, as did the court in Vandenberg, that absent reasonable suspicion
there can be no justification for a detention of any length. This is particularly true where the court of appeals relied on Robbs for determining the
reasonable scope of detention in the same case.197 Given the opportunity

190. Id. at 31.
191. State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 23, 81 P.3d 19, 25.
192. State v. Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶ 9, 136 P.3d 570, 574.
193. State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 39, 52, 164 P.3d 57, 68, 71 (Bosson, J.,
dissenting).
194. Id. ¶ 39, 164 P.3d at 68 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Id. ¶ 32, 164 P.3d at 66.
197. State v. Neal, No. 25,864, Memorandum Opinion at 6.
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for confusion, the court should have made clear that no detention is acceptable absent reasonable suspicion. Otherwise, the court leaves open
the chance that law enforcement officers and future courts may mistakenly believe that a shorter or less intrusive detention is justified even absent reasonable suspicion. A clearer statement of the importance of this
type of balancing in a reasonable suspicion analysis would have elucidated search and seizure law and made for more useful precedent.
VI. NEW MEXICO’S NEED FOR CLEAR REASONABLE
SUSPICION JURSIPRUDENCE
Since its publication, State v. Neal has been cited repeatedly by both
the New Mexico Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme Court
in opinions regarding reasonable suspicion.198 Perhaps a sign of its lack of
strength is that Neal is rarely cited for its overall reasonable suspicion
analysis. Most often, Neal is cited for its analysis of one of the many factors that may come into play in a reasonable suspicion analysis, such as
the defendant’s nervousness, location, or associations with other
criminals. As explained above, the real difficulty lies in the fact that the
fact-specific nature of the totality of the circumstances analysis can lead
to uncertain results. The analysis will necessarily be different in every
case, because it is next to impossible for two cases to involve the exact
same set of facts. Moreover, the results from the analysis, even in the
same case and looking at the same facts, often differ from judge to judge
and justice to justice.
Because New Mexico interprets article II, section 10 of its constitution as providing broader protection to individual privacy than the Fourth
Amendment, a clear and well-reasoned reasonable suspicion analysis becomes increasingly important as the courts expand its use into new contexts.199 Clear and instructive opinions are necessary to help law
enforcement officers shape their conduct, to make individuals aware of
their rights, and to guide the courts in making future decisions. New Mexico opinions since Neal reveal that the courts have been doing a more
thorough job of analyzing and explaining their analyses in the reasonable
suspicion context. Uncertainty remains, however, as these decisions still
involve several judges and justices coming out on different sides of the
analysis.200 Although the method for applying the totality of circum198. Lexis Nexis Shepard’s Report: State v. Neal (February 10, 2013) available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/ (log in, then follow “Get a Document” hyperlink, then
type in “164 P.3d 57”, then follow “Shepardize” hyperlink) (cited 45 times).
199. See State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 14, 18, 142 P.3d 933, 937–38, 940.
200. See Part VI(B), infra.
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stances test has been established, the fact remains that it is far from an
easily applied, objective, bright-line rule. Because there is no way to
make the test truly objective, the best the court can do is to fully analyze
and explain its decision-making process to help guide future courts, officers, and individuals.
A. New Mexico Appellate Opinions Analyzing Reasonable Suspicion
Post-Neal
In the five years since the New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in
Neal, the New Mexico appellate courts have had occasion to analyze reasonable suspicion over 120 times. Of these 120 opinions, the courts have
often looked to Neal for guidance, citing the opinion forty-four times. A
survey of some of these recent opinions reveals that, since Neal, the New
Mexico appellate courts have worked hard to provide fully reasoned
opinions. Because of the nature of the reasonable suspicion analysis and
totality of the circumstances test, however, many times the same facts and
law lead to very different results when viewed by different judges and
justices. The law regarding reasonable suspicion, therefore, remains
largely unpredictable.
1. State v. Anaya: Three court of appeals judges find officer conduct
unreasonable; one magistrate court judge, one district court judge and
five supreme court justices find officer conduct reasonable
In Anaya, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision, which had reversed the district court’s order denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress.201 In this case, Anaya was driving toward
a DWI checkpoint at approximately 2 a.m.202 When Anaya came within
sight of the sign indicating an upcoming checkpoint, she made a legal Uturn and drove in the opposite direction to avoid the stop.203 Officers observing her actions followed Anaya and ultimately arrested her for
DWI.204 In support of her motion to suppress, Anaya argued that the legal
U-turn was insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that she was committing a crime, and thus the stop was unconstitutional.205 The district

201. State v. Anaya, 2009-NMSC-043, ¶ 1, 217 P.3d at 587.
202. Id. ¶ 4, 217 P.3d at 587.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. ¶ 5, 217 P.3d at 588. Anaya originally filed her motion to suppress in magistrate court, where her motion was denied. She entered a plea of nolo contendere,
reserving her right to challenge the stop in district court. Id.
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court denied her motion, finding that under the totality of the circumstances officers had reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle.206
The court of appeals found that the available facts were insufficient
to create the reasonable suspicion required for officers to stop Anaya’s
vehicle.207 The court noted that evading a DWI checkpoint was itself not
illegal and that the facts upon which the district court had relied were all
legal acts.208 Thus, the court found that the circumstances amounted to
only a generalized suspicion that Anaya was breaking the law, and it reversed the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress.209
The supreme court then granted certiorari and, in a unanimous
opinion, reversed the decision of the court of appeals.210 Although the
court agreed that a legal U-turn alone was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it noted that reasonable suspicion does
not require officers to observe illegal activity.211 In coming to its decision,
the court relied on the officer’s experience in similar situations, the time
of day, and the nature of the roadway where the U-turn occurred.212 The
court stated that affirming the court of appeals’ decision would essentially
tell officers to “ignore reality,” and that the case presented reasonable,
articulable facts from which the officers could draw sufficient inferences
to form reasonable suspicion.213
2. State v. Sewell: Three court of appeals judges find officer conduct
unreasonable; one district court judge and five supreme court justices
find officer conduct reasonable
In Sewell, the supreme court reversed a court of appeals decision
reversing the district court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.214 The court of appeals had held that the continuation of an investigatory stop in order for an officer to speak privately with a passenger of
the vehicle was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.215 Looking
at the same set of facts, both courts analyzed whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to detain an individual suspected of drug trafficking
206. The district court considered Anaya’s U-turn in conjunction with consideration of the time, place, and manner of her action. Anaya, 2009-NMSC-043, ¶ 6, 217
P.3d at 588.
207. State v. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-077, ¶ 19, 185 P.3d 1096, 1100.
208. Id. ¶ 19, 185 P.3d at 1100.
209. Id. ¶¶ 19–20, 185 P.3d at 1100.
210. Anaya, 2009-NMSC-043, 217 P.3d 586.
211. Id. ¶ 12, 217 P.3d at 589.
212. Id. ¶ 17, 217 P.3d at 590.
213. Id. ¶ 15, 217 P.3d at 589.
214. State v. Sewell, 2009-NMSC-033, ¶ 1, 211 P.3d 885, 886.
215. Id. ¶ 11, 211 P.3d at 887.
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after a search of the suspect’s vehicle failed to turn up any evidence.216
Unlike the court of appeals, however, the supreme court found that the
evolving circumstances facing the officers made it reasonable for them to
expand the scope of their investigation.217 The court stated that it would
have been unreasonable for the officer to ignore the passenger’s attempts
to communicate something to him.218 The court of appeals and the supreme court came to opposite conclusions regarding the reasonableness
of the officers’ actions under the totality of the circumstances, and each of
the respective decisions were unanimous.219
3. State v. Alderete: One district court judge and one court of appeals
judge find officer conduct unreasonable; two court of appeals judges
find officer conduct reasonable
In Alderete, the district court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of her vehicle during a
traffic stop.220 The officers contended that they had reasonable suspicion
to stop her vehicle based on surveillance of the house from which her
vehicle came and on a reliable tip that drugs were to be delivered to that
house and then redistributed.221 When Alderete left the residence, officers
followed her and eventually stopped her vehicle for a traffic violation.222
The district court found that the traffic stop was pretextual, and that the
officers lacked reasonable suspicion for their real motive for the stop,

216. Id. The relevant facts involved an undercover Albuquerque Police Department detective who observed a known prostitute speaking to the driver of a truck
who had pulled up to her on the street. The prostitute got into the truck and the
driver then made several erratic driving maneuvers in and out of residential neighborhoods. Soon after, the truck stopped so that the prostitute could make a call at a pay
phone. The truck then proceeded to a shopping center parking lot, followed by a
Cadillac driven by the defendant. The prostitute got out of the truck and into the back
seat of the Cadillac and then both vehicles left the parking lot. Suspecting that a drug
transaction had just taken place, the detective requested that another officer make an
investigatory stop of the Cadillac. The defendant gave the officer permission to search
the vehicle, but no drugs were found. During this time, the female passenger (the
prostitute) appeared afraid and officer felt that she was trying to indicate that there
was something she wanted him to investigate. He pulled her aside to speak to her
privately, and she told him that she and the defendant were making a crack deal and
that the drugs were in her bra. Id. ¶¶ 3–7, 211 P.3d at 572–573.
217. Id. ¶ 22, 211 P.3d at 890.
218. Id. ¶ 24, 211 P.3d at 890.
219. See Sewell, 2009-NMSC-033, ¶ 24, 211 P.3d at 890; State v. Sewell, 2008NMCA-027, 177 P.3d 536.
220. State v. Alderete, 2011-NMCA-055, ¶ 1, 255 P.3d 377, 378.
221. Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 255 P.3d at 379–80.
222. Id. ¶ 4, 255 P.3d at 379.
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which was to investigate drug activity.223 According to the district court,
because officers did not have any reasonable suspicion that was directed
at Alderete herself, their motive for stopping her vehicle was unsupported by reasonable suspicion.224
The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the necessary reasonable suspicion was based on detectives’ surveillance of the house from
which Alderete exited, a reliable tip that drugs would be delivered to and
redistributed from that house, corroboration of that tip, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the facts.225 The court found that
although the detectives did not have any information regarding Alderete
herself, they did have reasonable suspicion to believe that any vehicle
leaving that house under those circumstances was involved in drug activity.226 In the opinion, the court emphasized its duty to “shape the parameters of police conduct by placing the constitutional requirement of
reasonableness in factual context.”227
Because he found that the majority opinion improperly characterized some of the relevant facts and that the detectives did not possess any
particularized information regarding Alderete, her vehicle and its contents, or the plans for the movement of the drugs, Judge Garcia dissented
from the majority opinion.228 He did not believe that the closeness in time
between Alderete’s departure from the home and her husband’s prior
departure allowed the officers to infer that she was transporting some or
all of the remaining drugs, particularly when the officers did not know at
that time that the first driver was her husband.229 Thus, according to Judge
Garcia’s analysis of the facts, the officers’ underlying motives for the traffic stop were based only on speculative hunches and unsupported
conjecture.230
4. State v. Olson: Three court of appeals judges find officer conduct
unreasonable; one district court judge and five supreme court justices
find officer conduct reasonable
Recently, in State v. Olson, the New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed the reasonableness of an officer’s expansion of a traffic stop into a

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. ¶ 10, 255 P.3d at 381.
Id. ¶ 13, 255 P.3d at 381.
Alderete, 2011-NMCA-055, ¶ 20, 255 P.3d at 383.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21, 255 P.3d at 384.
Id. ¶ 30, 255 P.3d at 385 (Garcia, J, dissenting).
Id. ¶ 33, 255 P.3d at 386 (Garcia, J, dissenting).
Alderete, 2011-NMCA-055, ¶ 39, 255 P.3d at 389 (Garcia, J, dissenting).
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prostitution investigation.231 In Olson, the court of appeals had reversed
the district court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress,232
and once again the supreme court reversed the decision of the court of
appeals.233 This case involved an officer who observed Olson pull into an
alley, appear to recognize the police car, and immediately back out of the
alley and drive away.234 Olson’s behavior made the officer suspicious; he
followed the vehicle, noticed that the temporary tags were expired, and
conducted a traffic stop.235 When the officer approached the vehicle, Olson was rummaging for his paperwork and would not make eye contact
with the officer.236 The officer recognized the passenger of the vehicle as a
known prostitute, and based on her dress and makeup, he concluded that
she must have been working that evening.237 After the officer separated
Olson and the passenger, Olson told the officer that he was just giving the
passenger a ride and that she was not working that night.238 When the
officer asked if Olson had a driver’s license on him, Olson reached for his
fanny pack.239 For safety reasons, the officer asked if Olson had any weapons in the pack and requested to take a look to make sure; Olson
agreed.240 In the fanny pack were three crack pipes, and Olson subsequently revealed that he had cocaine in his front pocket.241
The district court denied Mr. Olson’s motion to suppress, finding
that the officer’s actions in searching the fanny pack were reasonable
under the circumstances.242 The court of appeals reversed this decision
because it found that the officer did not have any articulable, reasonable
suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop to inquire as to Olson’s
relationship with his passenger.243 The court stated that the officer’s
knowledge that the passenger was a prostitute was insufficient to allow
him to infer that Olson had hired his passenger to engage in a sexual
act.244

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

State v. Olson, 2012-NMSC-035, 285 P.3d 1066.
State v. Olson, 2011-NMCA-056, ¶ 1, 258 P.3d 1140, 1142.
Olson, 2012-NMSC-035, ¶ 1, 285 P.3d at 1067.
Id. ¶ 2, 285 P.3d at 1067.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 285 P.3d at 1067.
Id.
State v. Olson, 2011-NMCA-056, ¶ 4, 258 P.3d 1140, 1143.
Olson, 2012-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 285 P.3d at 1068.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6, 285 P.3d at 1068.
Olson, 2011-NMCA-056, ¶ 8, 258 P.3d at 1143.
Id. ¶ 17, 258 P.3d at 1145.
Id.
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The supreme court disagreed, finding that the officer had articulated
several specific reasons he believed Olson was engaged in soliciting prostitution.245 In doing so, the court analyzed more than just the officer’s
familiarity with the passenger of the vehicle and her appearance—it also
looked at the time and location of the incident, Olson’s erratic driving
behavior, and the fact that he avoided eye contact with the officer after
being pulled over for expired tags.246 Under these facts, the court determined that the record supported a finding that the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Olson was involved in the solicitation of a
prostitute, so it reversed the decision of the court of appeals.247
B. The Court’s Interpretation of Article II, Section 10, Has Resulted in a
Greater Need for Clear Reasonable Suspicion Analyses
The totality of the circumstances test for reasonable suspicion is not
based on an easily applied, bright-line rule, and presents the same difficulties under both the U.S. and New Mexico constitutions. Arguably, the
potential consequences of a less-than-perfect analysis, such as that in
Neal, are greater in cases determined under the New Mexico Constitution.248 It is well settled that article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution affords criminal defendants broader protections than does the
Fourth Amendment.249 Thus, in several contexts New Mexico courts have
chosen to eschew the bright-line rules established by federal courts and
instead to consider whether officer conduct is reasonable under the facts
of each case.250
As a result of New Mexico’s consistent avoidance of bright-line
rules in search and seizure contexts, the number of cases in which New
Mexico courts are required to make reasonableness determinations has
increased over the past several years.251 For example, New Mexico has
chosen to analyze reasonableness in determining the reliability of an
anonymous tip,252 the propriety of vehicle searches incident to arrest,253
whether an individual has been seized for the purposes of article II, sec-

245. Olson, 2012-NMSC-035, ¶ 15, 285 P.3d at 1070.
246. Id. ¶ 15, 285 P.3d at 1070.
247. Id. ¶¶ 15, 22, 285 P.3d at 1070, 1072.
248. Although Neal itself was analyzed under the U.S. Constitution, it has and continues to be cited by New Mexico courts in cases analyzed under the New Mexico
state constitution.
249. State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 14, 142 P.3d 933, 937.
250. State v. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 14, 125 P.3d 647, 650-51.
251. See Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 14, 142 P.3d at 937–38.
252. See State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 52 P.3d 964.
253. See State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, 188 P.3d 95.
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tion 10,254 and whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when the initial reason given for the stop is found to be pretextual.255
The increase in the number of contexts in which the courts must analyze
reasonable suspicion has resulted in the increased frequency with which
the courts must apply the totality of the circumstances analysis.256
C. How can anyone be sure what constitutes reasonable suspicion?
As explained herein and by the New Mexico and federal courts, reasonable suspicion cannot be narrowed down to a neat set of rules. Because of the variety of factual situations and circumstances present in
each case, there simply is no bright-line test to determine whether a law
enforcement officer in fact had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that an
individual has broken a law. As evinced by the disparity from one judge
or justice to another as to what constitutes reasonable suspicion, even
under the same set of facts there is no way to be certain. In order to
provide guidance in this area, therefore, the courts must fully analyze all
available facts and provide a thorough explanation of the reasoning underlying their decisions. Defendants, attorneys, and law enforcement will
then have to face the uncertain task of piecing together the facts of each
individual case in order to determine their chances of proving or disproving the existence of reasonable suspicion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Appellate courts have a duty to provide guidance to future courts by
clearly and carefully explaining their reasoning in their decisions.257 In
cases involving police officer conduct, appellate courts also have a duty to
provide those officers with tools that will aid them in their daily activities,
prevent them from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens, and
avoid suppression of evidence of criminal activity.258 In State v. Neal, the
New Mexico Supreme Court missed an opportunity to add to the factual
and analytical mosaic that comprises reasonable suspicion precedent.259
The court’s opinion would have better served its purpose as effective pre-

254. See State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, 217 P.3d 1032.
255. See State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, 206 P.3d 143.
256. State v. Gonzales, 2011-NMSC-012, ¶ 15, 257 P.3d 894, 898 (stating that the
court must look at the totality of the circumstances in analyzing whether an officer
had reasonable suspicion).
257. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 147 (2008) (“Outcomes are important, but so is the route by which the Court gets there.”).
258. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002).
259. See id.
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cedent if the court had evaluated Officer LaSalle’s reasonable suspicion
by considering all of the facts known to him, including some discussion of
his specialized training and experience (or lack thereof, if appropriate),
and clarifying the circumstances in which a court is required to balance
the governmental interests against individual interests in a reasonable
suspicion analysis. By failing to do so, the court has diminished the clarity, strength, and utility of the Neal opinion.
Since Neal, New Mexico appellate courts have had occasion to analyze reasonable suspicion in a variety of factual contexts. As explained
herein, New Mexico has declined to adopt the federal bright-line tests in
many search and seizure contexts and instead has chosen to determine
reasonable suspicion under a totality of the circumstances analysis. Our
state has chosen to do so in order to afford its citizens greater privacy
protections under article II, section 10 than those offered by the Fourth
Amendment. While the totality of the circumstances test may afford individuals broader protections, it often also leads to unpredictable results.
Sometimes it is difficult to find the reason in a reasonable suspicion analysis. The courts have a responsibility to analyze all available facts and
provide a thorough explanation of the reasoning underlying their decisions. It is only through these steps that our courts can meaningfully contribute to the “factual mosaic” that comprises reasonable suspicion law in
New Mexico. This, in turn, will help the courts to provide guidance to law
enforcement, citizens, and future courts alike.

